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ABSTRACT 
The aim of the article is twofold. First, it aims to overview current empirical methods in the area of  
first-person research. Such a review cannot overlook epistemological and ontological issues, but must 
at the same time keep in mind methodological and almost technical nature of the problem. Empirical 
experience research is positioned within the frame of cognitive science and the overview of 
approaches and techniques of empirical phenomenology is presented, together with epistemological 
considerations. The second aim of the paper is concerned with the future of research in the discussed 
area. It suggests that in-depth, existentially liable introspection and self-inquiry should be considered 
as serious scientific research tools. 
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COGNITIVE SCIENCE AS NEW ENCOURAGEMENT FOR 
THE RESEARCH OF EXPERIENCE 
Research of experience, or empirical research of experience to be precise, is an area which 
has been dealt with by science on several occasions (most vigorously in the framework of the 
project of the so-called German introspectionism at the beginning of XX. century), and, due 
to evident problems encountered in the objectivisation of the subjective, abandoned on no 
fewer accounts. The most recent attempt has emerged in the area of cognitive science – an 
interdisciplinary conjunction of different approaches in exploration of psyche. It is most 
interesting that it was exactly the progress in objective (third-person) research of cognition 
that spurred the re-emergence of studying the immediate, lived (first-person) human experience. 
It was neuroscientists themselves, whose mission is supposedly to find out the neurophysiological 
correlates to experience, who started to realize that it was not just the third-person perspective 
that was being problematic, but that our knowledge of the first-person one leaves much to be 
desired. This insight soon led to the realization that it was not easy to attain reliable data 
about experience. It does not suffice to just ask or merely to prepare a good questionnaire. 
The need for a serious, scientifically sound study of experience had first been hinted at in the 
70s by the cybernetics pioneer Heinz von Foerster 1, but it was his disciple, the biologist 
Francisco Varela, who articulated this need in a much more systematic and detailed way. The 
breakthrough article in which he introduced the concept of neurophenomenology 2, 3 was 
soon followed by the compendium entitled The View from Within 4. Ever since the 90s, the 
empirical research of experience has been gaining its place in the framework of cognitive 
science despite strong criticism and opposition. These may be most clearly seen in the 
division of the areas of research into the psyche as sketched in the lectures of one of the most 
prominent cognitive neuroscientists Antonio Damasio 5; p.94: events in the brain 
(physiology), behaviour (mostly psychology) and experience. 
But the fact that first-person research got its place on the map of cognitive science approaches 
does not yet prove that Varela’s ideas have flourished in the way delineated by him in his 
conception of the neurophenomenological project. The area of thinking about and practically 
realising such type of research is still a mere fledgling. We are still a long way from Varela’s 
vision of two equally balanced areas of first-person and third-person research which would – 
each from its own side of the epistemological gap – build up a unified corpus of knowledge. 
In recent years, a wide array of attempts at gaining and interpreting data about experience has 
been developed. Nevertheless, the research of experience is at this stage still but little more 
than a kind of aid to third-person research; an aid to be used only in the case of greatest need 
and the results of which should always be proofed by other methods as well. This lack of 
methodological autonomy is for the most part the consequence of epistemological problems 
looming in the background, which scientists mostly tend to avoid. Due to that, the attitude 
pervading this area is for now still that it has failed to produce new insights into the psyche. 
The aim of the present article is to offer a slightly more self-conscious view of the sensibility 
and possibility of gaining first-person data. Its scope is thus very wide. If we intend to 
understand the problems of experience research, we must not avoid the epistemological and 
ontological questions. Meanwhile we must also never lose sight of the methodological and 
almost technical nature of the problem. The present article intends to give an overview of the 
area with no ambition of offering definitive solutions. It has been written by acknowledging 
the superficial manner of addressing some of the very important aspects of the experiential 
landscape. Its aim is to present a kind of a map of approaches, accompanied by 
epistemological reflections to shed light upon their validity and significance. 




Let me begin by trying to delineate the area of empirical phenomenological research, what 
exactly it studies and what kind of data it operates with. 
The question which part of reality does empirical phenomenological research actually study 
cannot be answered in the same way as with other sciences. Phenomenological research deals 
with a part of the world, which is most intimate, or rather immediate, to us, the world ‘as it 
presents itself’. The physical world, human behaviour, social world ... all these are but 
diverse orderings of the experiential world – and all of them are less existentially immediate. 
Varela relied on the phenomenological tradition: “The phenomenological approach starts from 
the irreducible nature of conscious experience. Lived experience is where we start from.” 2. 
Perhaps our area of research has been most clearly indicated by the philosopher Nagel 6 in 
the title of his article ‘What Is it Like to Be a Bat?’. “Clearly ‘what it is like to be’ a bat or a 
human being refers to how things (everything) looks when being a bat or a human being. In 
other words this is just another way of talking about what philosophers have called 
phenomenality since the Presocratics. A phenomenon, in the most original sense of the word, 
is an appearance and therefore something relational. It is a being for as opposed to being 
alone in itself … “ 4; p.3. 
 The question what is experience is hard to answer by reducing it to other psychological 
concepts. It cannot be described simply as this or that. When talking about the gestalt of 
experience, we are speaking about what is it like to be this particular human being in this 
particular chosen moment. The area of our research is experience, i.e. everything that goes on 
in the scope of an individual’s awareness. Thus we are interested in how the content of 
consciousness is demonstrated, rather than what is being demonstrated. In relation to this, 
Merleau-Ponty 7; p.ix states: Going back to the things themselves means going back into a 
world before knowledge. 
At this point we might pose the question what kind of data about experience can be gained 
and how? Reflecting upon the how brings us to the paramount problem of phenomenological 
research: the fact that observation essentially changes the observed. For Searle this 
represented the key argument for rejecting empirical phenomenological research: Any 
introspection of one’s own conscious states is itself a conscious state 8; p.97. 
In his article Varela showed the inconsistency of such criticism: if Searle really had believed 
in the power of this argument, he should abstain from any statements about conscious states 
(which he naturally does not do). Directing our attention to the how of experience does 
indeed change our experiential landscape, but that does not mean that it becomes a 
completely different existential landscape. Dressed into attention to itself alone it mostly just 
begins to shine in a whole new light. Petranker 9 wrote that by observing we become 
conscious differently. 
If we think it through, the situation in the area of phenomenological research is not so much 
different from the situation in other scientific fields. Physics for example is also unable to 
directly describe physical reality: at the quantum level it is forced to settle for the observation 
of the effects of the processes observed. At this level, similarly to the observation of 
experience, we cannot bypass the influence of the observer. Thus even in the areas of 
‘hardest’ braches of scientific research we are able to observe traces of past events. Traces, or 
in the case of experience research, memories. 
We may notice a deep and almost indivisible connection between phenomenological, 




epistemological question: What can be perceived at all? is but a small step away from the 
question of carrying out such a research (What is with directing attention?). The results and 
validity of the observations depend on the way of looking. Husserl was well aware of this 
fact, as was Varela. The skill of observation (gaining data) in the research of experience is 
just as important as in any other branch of science. Neither did Varela overlook the fact that 
some types of Buddhist meditation have been indulging in training the skills of observing 
experience for thousands of years. Large parts of The Embodied Mind 10 and The View 
from Within 4 are dedicated to discussing the relation of mindfulness training practice (like 
e.g. Buddhist vipassana meditation) to first-person research. Here we do not wish to address 
the skill of observing the here-and-now of one’s experiential landscape in detail, nevertheless 
it is perfectly clear that the practice of mindfulness is a skill of intimate self-research 2. The 
question to what degree it is possible for Buddhist practice to come in useful in this and how 
remains open for now. 
Even if direct observation of experience in the form of mindfulness/awareness is indeed the 
technique (skill) of observing the experiential landscape here-and-now, scientific research 
can only be endeavoured once we are able to articulate our insights. And the only way of 
perceiving experience that allows us to position experiential data into intersubjective space is 
the articulation of memories of past experience, the memory of experience itself being 
another kind of experience, of course. But here we already come across a difference, since 
memory is just a part of the larger field of awareness, which means it is possible for the 
observer to position himself outside of this part. Once such a position is achieved, it means 
that we might be able to observe the memory of experience from a (at least some) distance, 
thus allowing us to describe it. The only data available to phenomenological researchers is 
thus the so-called phenomenological data - descriptions of past experience. 
The ways of gaining phenomenological data and the question of what this data can tell us 
about our psyche will be dealt with in the following two chapters. At this point let me just 
clarify a potential confusion in the terminology of the nomenclature of the science dedicated to 
the research of experience. Since most of the basic concepts in this field of research originate 
in Husserl’s work, the accepted term has become phenomenological research. But since 
gathering of data based on observation was especially in his later period bitterly opposed by 
Husserl, it is only just to add the clarifying epithet empirical to it. Occasionally, one might 
even hear the term phenomenography, but it has yet to catch on. Sometimes we deem this 
research project to be first-person research, but this term is also problematic: while we do study 
the first-person perspective (as opposed to the third-person one dealing with behaviour and 
neurophysiology), it is nevertheless true that this term makes it unclear as to whose experience 
we are actually researching (first-person could thus designate the research of my own 
experience, while third-person might refer to the experience of the participants of the research). 
DOES EMPIRICAL RESEARCH OF EXPERIENCE MAKE SENSE? 
Before we review different attempts to gain first-person data, we cannot ignore the criticism 
and a wide array of scepticism that surrounds this field of research. Varela 2, 4 inspects the 
list of negative attitudes and objections in detail, especially the ones from the area of 
philosophy of mind and hardcore cognitive science. In both of his works he gives extensive 
answers, so let me at this point merely enumerate some of the most common areas or rather 
arguments of the critics from this field. 
Perhaps the most common, even though rarely properly articulated, is a lack of interest for in-
depth research of experience. There is a common naturalistic presupposition that 
consciousness is but an epiphenomenon and that it is essential to explain its neurological 
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basis. Once we reach that goal, first-person research will become obsolete. 
Introspection changes experience (or rather, it is itself a form of experience). 
This argument presented by Varela through Searle’s words has already been mentioned 
above: it is quite problematic to (scientifically) study something that changes through the 
very act of observing it. It is a problem which all so-called non-trivial areas of research 
(should) face 11, from quantum mechanics to ethnology. In many areas we encounter a 
circular bond between observation/research and the observed/researched: In the area of 
experience research this bond is so immediate that there is absolutely no way to ignore it. 
The subjective simply cannot be objectivised. 
This is essentially a methodological problem. Many authors tend to be very sceptical about 
the usefulness of experiential data in understanding human psyche. Varela 2 quotes an 
example of Searle’s findings that in all the years we have been endeavouring to study 
experience, no agreement about a valid method has been reached. While Searle’s assessment 
is based on a rather superficial and naive overview of the history of first-person research, it is 
nevertheless correct to a certain point. But the conclusion drawn from it by Searle is 
problematic, to say the least. If we can agree that the knowledge about lived experience is 
important, this should motivate us to search for new, more viable methods instead of giving 
up hope altogether. 
Understanding experience is being taken care of by psychology. 
The final chapters of The View from Within 4 include an overview of responses of 
representatives from the fields of cognitive science and philosophy of mind to the described 
attempts of establishing a field of research dealing with experience. The title of Baars’ article 
for example is most telling: The field of systematic phenomenology already exists. It is called 
psychology 4; p.216, 10. The idea that there is nothing in the area of experience which 
psychology (or some other science) had not yet discovered was apparently still present at the 
turn of the century. Now, fifteen years later, it is virtually non-existent. 
As already mentioned, in his articles Varela deals extensively with criticism from the side of 
cognitive science and philosophy of mind. Interestingly though, he does not mention the 
critiques from the opposite field, i.e. phenomenologists themselves. Varela 2 positions his 
own view of the meaning and role of experience research into the framework of continental 
phenomenolgy, which indicates that he planned for his neurophenomenological project 
believing to follow its phenomenological guidelines. It is a fact that during the preparation of 
The View from Within he collaborated with several important representatives of the French 
phenomenological movement (for example Natalie Depraz). It would seem that he received a 
positive reaction to his idea of the neurophenomenological project from these circles, even 
though such an attempt is very remote from Husserl’s opinions and the viewpoints of many 
younger phenomenologists following in his stead, who directly oppose collecting empirical 
data about experience. Is the goal of empirical phenomenology as described here (and as 
described by Varela) exactly what Husserl tried to overcome in his later work? Husserl 
(following the publication of Logische Untersuchungen [12, 13]) noticed in his epistemological 
research the inconsistency of psychology which makes use of the laws of logic in its research 
while at the same time attempting to prove these very laws stem from the nature of the 
psyche, i.e. its field of research. In other words, how is it possible to study a concept if it is at 
the same time used as a tool? 
But Husserl would not settle for leaving his phenomenological project in the unclear waters 




empiricism and make it into a primary (eidetic) science. Hribar 14; p.56 writes that Husserl 
denounced all his former work as being in general empirically oriented. In the Idea of 
Phenomenology Husserl wrote: In Logische Untersuchungen phenomenology is presented as 
descriptive psychology (even though epistemological interests prevail in it). But this 
descriptive phenomenology, which could be understood as empirical phenomenology, should 
not be confused with transcendental phenomenology. Phenomenology which desires to be an 
essential, epistemic (a priori) science of cognition excludes the empirical attitude. (Quoted 
after Husserl’s ‘Die Idee der Phaenomenologie’ in 14; p.56). 
For those who endeavour to study experience, this critique from our own ranks is much 
stronger and more poignant. Interestingly, Varela does not address this problem. As 
mentioned above, this might be due to the fact that he collaborated with a circle of 
phenomenologists who themselves flirted with empiricism and tried to apply philosophical 
insights in practice, such as the psychiatrist Jean Naudin, for example. 
THE SPECTRUM OF DIFFERENT ATTITUDES TOWARDS 
EMPIRICAL PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH 
As we have seen, there is no lack of epistemological-methodological problems in the field of 
experience research. Nevertheless, in recent years this line of research has become a 
prominent feature of the patchwork of cognitive science. In the follow-up I intend to review 
some of the most promising contemporary approaches and try to determine how their 
advocates deal with the above mentioned problems. 
The ‘just ask’ approach (quantitative research) 
The most common way of dealing with the epistemological-methodological problems of first-
person research in the context of cognitive science is to simply ignore the issue. 
In 1972 Heinz von Foerster half jokingly penned down the so-called ‘first theorem’: ‘The 
more profound the problem we ignore, the better our chances for glory and success’ 15; p.1. 
Cynical and mocking as it may seem, it is nevertheless true. Cognitive neuroscience (and all 
other natural sciences before it, of course) has been able to achieve its immense progress 
exclusively by refusing to pose the questions about the fundaments of the phenomenon it is 
researching, i.e. what is consciousness, what is experience and what is the relationship 
between the experiential and the corporeal. The same goes for most of the quantitative studies 
of experience. As mentioned above, the majority of cognitive scientists tend to view the 
research of experience as a means to gain additional data for the study of the physiological 
basis of the psyche, i.e. as a kind of sidekick support. Fortunately, one does not have to delve 
too deep to meet this demand. 
In this type of studies psychological methods are being used. In gaining experiential data they 
mostly rely on questionnaires offering participants multiple choice answers or scales by 
which they have to assess the degree of intensity of a given experiential modality (e.g. How 
happy do you feel? Pick a number between 1 and 10!). In the field of experience research, it 
is of course much harder to assure the reliability of data gathering – after all, its area of 
research is subjectivity itself. Despite that problem, this approach to research has been 
flourishing in recent years. The research connected to low brain activity (i.e. to what the brain 
does when not occupied by a concrete task) may serve as a good example. At the level of 
experience this activity is associated with the so-called mind wandering, the study of which 
makes good use of the above mentioned methods. The questionnaire-type of research in the 
field of quantitative empirical phenomenology is usually carried out in the form of experience 
sampling – the participants are asked to answer a set of questions at selected moments (for an 
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example of such studies see 16, 17. 
The data gained in this way offer a good supplement to neurophysiological studies. They 
answer the questions of the frequency of given experiential categories, their intensity and the 
relation of (pre-selected) categories to (selected) contexts. It does not however enable us to 
check the adequacy of the selected options. This kind of research is therefore based on the 
assumption that we already know the structure of the experiential landscape – the task of 
first-person science is merely to determine its quantitative details.  
The problem lies in the fact that all researchers dealing with more in-depth observation of 
experience (e.g. 4, 18) find that our intuitive assumptions about this area are to a very large 
degree incorrect. Paradoxically, we see time and again that participants are not familiar with 
their (our) experience at all (the same being true for researchers, of course). The ‘just ask’ 
approach, as some designate it, is thus simply not viable. As suspected by Varela 2 and later 
empirically proven by Hurlburt 19, 20 a systematic and persistent training in observation of 
the experiential landscape is necessary. The studies which assume that their participants are 
well acquainted with their experience and therefore need only to be asked about it thus usually 
demonstrate little more than our own notions of what experiential landscape should look like. 
The same goes for philosophical arguments based on ‘self-evident’ examples in experience. 
Dialogic quantitative methods 
Experience – the area most intimate to us – appears to be at the same time the most opaque 
one. How can that be? Our awareness is virtually utterly unused to being directed at the how? 
of experience, due to its constant dealing with (being interested in, creating, manipulating) 
the contents of experience (the what?). Similarly to cinema, where the standard for a good 
film is to enable the audience to get completely sucked into the projected story and at the 
same time forget about the screen, the film projector etc., our everyday existential 
intentionality draws us into complete identification with the story, or rather, the so-called 
reality (in the everyday sense of the word). Husserl’s notion of natural standpoint appears to 
be quite adequate a description of this essential and very pervasive feature of our psyche. 
We are used to directing all of our attention to the results of ordering, interpreting, 
highlighting, categorizing and making sense of experience, and none at all to the process of 
doing so itself. The realization that we are poorly acquainted with our direct experience 10 
could be transformed into a methodological guideline in the research of experience: the natural 
standpoint needs to be put into brackets. Since this action opposes our habits, or rather our 
natural standpoint, the observation of experience calls for systematic and persistent training.  
It is not hard to notice that such insight into the nature of experience and the methodological 
guidelines for acquiring data on experience bear a striking resemblance to the fundamental 
concepts of Husserl’s phenomenology: the natural standpoint, epoché and phenomenological 
reduction. But despite these allusions to Husserl’s terminology, we must remember that in 
empirical research of experience all of these concepts are used in a more lax and wider scope 
than originally intended by the author of phenomenology. 
It is not wrong to say that the skill of observing experience is actually the skill of defying the 
natural standpoint, or rather of bracketing its effects. Besides, phenomenological reduction 
appears to be an apt term for doing so 21. But as mentioned above, the use of such terms is 
wider than intended by Husserl. The meaning of phenomenological reduction as a method of 
introspection in practice is twofold. The first aspect is the bracketing of assumptions, 
interpretations etc., i.e. the observation of experience as it shows itself to us. In order to 
achieve this, we must employ the other aspect: turn our attention to the structure of 




projection mechanism. For example: instead of paying attention to the content of our 
thoughts, we should try to notice how we think. Do we quietly talk to ourselves or do we see 
images or do we simply know the content without any other symbolic experiential 
representation? Perhaps in empirical gathering of first-person data this second aspect is even 
more important. 
Most of the contemporary schools of empirical research of experience have been developed 
basing on these methodological foundations. All of them share some common 
methodological guidelines: 
 the simple principle of ‘just ask’ does not work. In order to study experience, one needs 
extensive training in the skill of introspection. Due to this, research has to be iterative, 
 most of contemporary methods are dialogic. This means that the above mentioned iteration 
is achieved by repeated interviews with participants. 
Other methodological guidelines stem from Husserl’s phenomenology: 
 the focus on phenomena (things as they show themselves in our experience) and 
bracketing of all habitual assumptions about things. The reduction of everything observed 
into phenomena as the only thing in our experience that is really given and certain, 
 the search for as detailed descriptions of experience as possible and giving up 
interpretation. The training in describing experience (and in asking about such 
descriptions) without classifying it in any way, positioning it into theoretical frameworks, 
highlighting it etc. This includes also giving up any assessments about the ‘reality’ of the 
observed phenomena. 
I will now present in more detail two methodological schools of empirical phenomenology, 
which are today probably most widespread and recognized: descriptive experience sampling 
and explicitation interview. A major difference between these two approaches lies in their 
attitudes towards retrospection. As seen in the previous chapter, the research of experience 
(with the exception of mindful observation of experience here-and-now) is in its essence a 
study of memories about past experience. In phenomenological research, memory is the basic 
medium that allows us to access our field of research. Undoubtedly, memory is not exactly an 
ideal interface; due to that one of the crucial questions any method needs to address is how to 
approach lived experience as precisely as possible. How to preserve past insights intact? 
The biggest difference between the two schools of empirical phenomenological research that 
will be mentioned here lies exactly in their attitudes towards the problem of ‘purity’ of 
memory. The difference being that one of them tries to reduce retrospection to the minimum, 
while the other one strives to train the interviewer in the dialogic skill of ‘purifying’ the 
constructs induced by memory. 
In Paris, a new methodological approach has formed around the phenomenologist and 
psychotherapist Pierre Vermersch. Its most prominent representative is Varela’s assistant 
Claire Petitmengin. The researchers in this approach devised a dialogic method known as the 
explicitation interview 22. Its major feature is the attempt to polish the art of interviewing 
so far that it might access even more remote memories and release them of the constructs 
deposited in the meantime. It appears that such ‘purification’ (which is of course an iterative 
process) is indeed possible and often quite successful. Petitmengin’s research in the field of 
experiencing the self proved to be most insightful 23. There is also the slightly older work 
from the area of the so-called preconscious states (e.g. 24). She was also a member of the 
group, which pursued with the work in the field of neurophenomenology after Varela’s 
untimely death. The group eventually dissolved, since participating neurologists did not 
perceive phenomenological work to be relevant enough. 
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The concept of the explicitation interview has gained some ground in recent years. Different 
derivations of this approach are being used in the study of experiential patterns, i.e. recurring 
elements of experiential landscape. An example of this is the emergence of thought 24 or 
the research of the experiential aspects of intuition 25. 
A different approach to this problem is the one taken by Russell Hurlburt, the inventor of the 
descriptive experience sampling technique (DES) 26. DES could be compared to geological 
probing of the ground: samples are taken at random points and later purified and analyzed in 
a laboratory. Similarly, DES probes (samples) experience at randomly selected moments. The 
probing is carried out with the help of research subjects who carry with them a special device, 
which emits a gentle signal at randomly selected moments. The subject then tries to ‘freeze’ 
his or her experience just prior to the beep. Unlike simply answering questions about 
experience (as with the quantitative experience sampling mentioned above), here we are 
dealing with free descriptions of experience, made in a handy notebook, or lately more often 
a portable recording device. As all other methods, this one is also based on repetition and 
interviews. No later than 24 hours after probing, the participant must meet with the researcher 
who tries to gain as much exact data about the experience as possible through a discussion of 
the samples. Unlike the explicitation interview, Hurlburt’s technique is not directed into 
purifying the constructs of retrospection. Its power lies in the large number of collected 
samples and the reduction of the consequences of retrospection to the minimum. Hurlburt 
teaches that the researcher should give up the discussion of a selected sample as soon as one 
gets the feeling that the participant has passed from exploring his or her memories to 
pondering or construction. The principal training in this technique consists of the skill of 
‘open’ interview and recognizing and avoiding interpretation (e.g. 19). 
The results of DES provide us with a kind of map of a participant’s experiential landscape. 
The technique has been in use for almost forty years now and it is probably the most widespread 
and methodical version of contemporary first-person research. Ever since it appeared, researchers 
have gathered an astounding amount of data about experience, so that they were able to put 
together a kind of encyclopedia of basic experiential elements (the so-called codebook). 
As we can see, these two approaches to experience research are complementary. Techniques 
such as DES are useful for ‘drawing out’ a map of everyday experience, while dialogic 
methods of explicitation can delve into more specific (selected) aspects of experience. So 
while contemporary empirical methods of experience research are to a large extent based on 
the guidelines of Husserl’s phenomenological reduction, their research nevertheless remains 
at the level of gathering descriptive data - which is exactly the level Husserl tried to avoid. It 
is a fact that research of experience in the context of cognitive science does not share 
Husserl’s ambition of being a primary eidetic science. One of the critiques of DES is that it 
remains on the surface of experience all the time. But Hurlburt is not discouraged by such 
comments 18. He claims that this level is exactly what he is aiming at in his research. He 
even likes to pass the ball back by attacking the so-called armchair introspection 20, 
philosophical debates which do not base their arguments on systematic training of 
introspection but rather on self-evident knowledge about experience. 
In-depth first-person research 
Despite the fact that the most first-person research does not intend to answer deep epistemic 
questions, there are some (of us) who aim at a higher goal. For example, already the title of 
Varela’s 2 article reveals his expectations that empirical phenomenology should bring (or at 
least help in bringing) the solution to the ‘hard problem’, i.e. the mind-body relationship problem. 




its role of a theoretical science). The vicious circle between exploring the psyche as the origin 
of rational argumentation and using rational argumentation as a tool to explore the psyche 
probably does seal the door of classic empiricism to understanding the nature of thrownness 
into experience. While we can use the methods of natural science to study the properties of 
our existential state, we can by no means do that in the research of its fundaments. 
On the other hand it has to be said that Husserl’s hopes for the emergence of a new, primary 
science did not come true. While phenomenology did become a well appreciated branch of 
philosophy, it never managed to gain the privileged position its author was hoping for. 
But perhaps there is a way between the rock of naturalistic reductionism and the hard place of 
sterile logical argumentation. Varela and Hurlburt clearly demonstrated the impotence of 
bringing conclusions without basing them on systematic checking. Husserl on the other hand 
demonstrated the limitations of the power of empirical results, included in the network of 
classic psychological science (or the naturalistic method). Husserl – as most philosophers 
with education in mathematics do – had a negative attitude towards any kind of circularity, 
but he never demonstrated any weaknesses of empirical research itself. Due to his fear of 
paradox, he failed to notice the possibility for mutual (creative) circular inspiring between 
concepts and empirical findings. Inspiring in which each side slightly changes at every step, 
according to the results of the previous iteration (in contemporary qualitative research this 
process is called sequential analysis). 
Perhaps it is necessary to take an earnest look at both sides: Husserl’s theoretical warnings as 
well as Hurlburt’s criticism of couch introspection. Is it possible to achieve so thorough an 
empirical research of experience that it will actually become fundamental? I believe that is 
so. I also believe that that is a kind of research Varela was aiming at. 
EXISTENTIALLY BINDING SELF-OBSERVATION 
As seen from the presented overview, the empirical research of experience is alive and 
gaining ground. So far we have yet to see some revolutionary breakthrough in this field, 
though. The gathering of data is still in its initial phase, approximately at the stage biology 
was in Humbold’s era: the phase of collecting samples and finding out the basic forms of 
organization of the researched area. But there is hope that at some point quantity will 
transform into quality and new, unexpected insights will emerge from the accumulated data. 
Besides the lateral gathering of data there is another option: the in-depth training of self-
observation; thorough first-person exploration (in the narrow sense of the word), which does 
not draw back before self-questioning and includes also an awareness of its assumptions and 
limitations (and searches for the still unreflected ones). Here I am referring to a type of 
research in which the researcher and the researched are one and the same person. 
Some authors believe phenomenological reduction in the deepest sense of the word to be 
exactly this kind of a persistent and systematic surveying of one’s experiential landscape 
(in 27 Cogan poses his argument drawing on Fink 28). As mentioned above, it would be 
wrong to ignore the similarities between the basic principles of phenomenological reduction 
and mindfulness training (with the help of techniques such as vipassana or zen Buddhism). 
The possibilities presented by the research of consciousness with the help of such meditation 
techniques have been addressed by Varela and his collaborators in two major works 4, 10. 
The idea of researching experience through an intimate in-depth self-research is thus by no 
means a new one. The real question being how come that it has never really took root – at 
least in the framework of contemporary science. In a way, the answer is obvious: meditative 
delving into oneself does not accord with the notions of contemporary science. The idea of a 
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researcher rummaging through his or her personal experience is in direct opposition to the 
demand for objectivity (intersubjectivity) of scientific discovery. Nevertheless, this argument 
is not sound. First of all, it is perfectly clear that the findings of in-depth self-research could 
become part of the scientific corpus only when confirmed by several researchers. Secondly, 
in the so-called in-depth qualitative research we are lately encountering an interesting 
paradox: the more intimate we get, the more general our findings are becoming. In other 
words, there is a real possibility that in-depth self-research will in the end bring us to a level 
transcending individual specificity. 
Another reason why systematic self-reflection has not yet become part of the canonical 
science of consciousness is that (contemporary) scientists refuse to indulge into existentially 
binding research. Varela 2 stated intimacy to be one of the necessary conditions for 
successful research of experience. Any researcher who earnestly ventures into the area of 
observing his or her own experience can expect this enterprise to change him or her. And this 
poses a crucial difference between this type of research and other methodological approaches 
– in this case personal involvement is not only allowed but indeed inevitable. Scientists 
embarking on in-depth first-person research of their experience find themselves in a similar 
situation as researchers of drugs in the 70s, i.e. in the times when most of them tried them out on 
themselves. And such research cannot be merely a job. The only possibility to achieve this is to 
make it into a kind of lifestyle. And that is very remote from contemporary role of researchers. 
In spite of these almost insurmountable obstacles I believe that in-depth first-person and – 
most importantly – existentially binding research is the only chance for truly in-depth insights 
into our consciousness, experience and human existential condition in general. Perhaps we 
should start this line of research by an in-depth critical study of the experience of people, who 
have dedicated their lives to the training of diverse techniques of mindfulness (in his work, 
Varela hinted at this step). Basing on that, we should then search for methodologically sound 
ways of tracking and recording the process of self-observation. 
Besides this, it is essential to explore the backgrounds of selected methods of self-observation. 
It is well known that the answer to any question depends on the way of posing it. Any 
observation is to a certain degree also a construction, depending on the presuppositions, 
intentions etc. of the researcher. This cannot be avoided. But it is perhaps not impossible to 
capture this usually unreflected part into the observation itself. 
The final step would thus be to offer space for systematic, recorded and, above all, 
existentially binding scientific self-observation. By this I aim at physical as well as social and 
scientific space. I hope for this paper to be a small contribution in this direction. 
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PROBLEMI I MOGUĆNOSTI ISTRAŽIVANJA U PRVOM LICU 
U. Kordeš 
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Ljubljana, Slovenija 
SAŽETAK 
Cilj ovog rada je dvojak. Prvo, radu daje pregled aktualnih empirijskih metoda u području istraživanja u prvom 
licu. Takav pregled ne može previdjeti epistemološka i ontološka pitanja, ali istovremeno mora razmatrati na 
umu metodološku i gotovo tehničku prirodu problema. Empirijsko istraživanje iskustva smješteno je u okviru 
kognitivne znanosti. Dan je pregled pristupa i tehnika empirijske fenomenologije zajedno s epistemološkim 
razmatranjima. Kao drugo, rad se bavi budućnošću istraživanja u razmatranom području. Rad upućuje da 
dubinska, egzistencijalno odgovorna introspekcija i preispitivanje nas samih treba smatrati alatima ozbiljnih 
znanstvenih istraživanja. 
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